Almost nothing has been written on this subject. M. Ostrogorski and R. Michels, have had, in contemporary political science, but late disciples. In Canada, the "party" phenomenon has received only a few chapters of rapid summary in textbooks such as those of Dawson and Corry, or historical monographs of the type of those by Morton, Mallory, and Williams.' All this constitutes a mass of usefnl information, but nothing which resembles an analytical framework to which one might usefully refer for specific studies of our parties.
Since 1950, French Canada, ordinarily circumscribed by its provincial frontiers, has become the subject of various essays classified under the title of "industrialisation in Quebec" or "the crisis of French Canada's conscience."2 But it is already significant that none of these essayists has been tempted to centre his view on the phenomenon "political parties." Making a rather "impressionistic" or intuitive study of the undercurrents of a society no longer stable in appearance, few of these essayists have had a scientific and analytical approach in studying a social condition which, at the same time as it integrates them, makes them manifestly dissatisfied. Whoever is concerned with political parties in Quebec starts off absolutely from zero.
The Union N ationale party gives the impression of having invincible strength. Except for an interval between 1939 and 1944, it has been in power since 1936. With his new victory in 1956, M. Duplessis has beaten successively all the records of the other "strong man," M. Taschereau, whom he defeated in 1936. The last twenty years reveal a parallel continuance of Liberal successes in Ottawa (the Quebec vote in the federal election of 1957 remained faithfnl to the Liberals, though a little less than in the past) and conservative successes in Quebec. In terms of electoral statistics the federal Liberal hold in Quebec has always been much stronger than the proviucial conservative one. Since 1944, M. Duplessis' party has won an absolute majority of votes: 1948, 51 per cent; 1952,50 per cent; 1956, 52 per cent. In 1944, it secured a minority of votes although it had a majority of seats in parliament (38 per cent and 45 seats as against 47 per cent and 37 Liberal seats). The great stability of these majorities is striking. But a very weak numerical majority is involved especially if one takes into consideration the negligible power-except in 1944----Df the third parties. (We are not concerned here with showing the distortions ariSing from the single-ballot uninominal voting and the sub-representation of urban ridings: such a situation is not characteristic of Quebec alone. But it must be pointed out, once and for all, that the 75 or 80 per cent of parliamentary seats held by M. Duplessis' party should not delude us; since 1948 they have been supported by only about 50 per cent of the popular vote.) The strength of the Union Nationale is marginal: with the exception of ahout 4 or 5 per cent of the votes, which go to Independents or third parties, the Liberals receive almost as many votes as does M. Duplessis' party. This fine majority is insecure.
The contradictory voting in Quebec and in Ottawa is often explained by the desire of the French Canadians to reach a federative balance between federal and provincial allegiances. This is too simple and too brief an explanation; it is also too ingenious and too clever, since such an explanation would presuppose at least a summary knowledge of the play of federative balance and therefore a minimum of political maturity. In my opinion, it is a clear but unsound idea arising from an a posteriori rationalization. Because of the ideolojrlcal vacuity of our politics, such a rational explanation seems artificial.
Quebec electors vote according to a reflex, which in the last twenty years has become conditioned. This primary reflex is not a desire to effect a balance within the Canadian federation or a desire to achieve autonomy, which would be its essential corollary and its immediate political application, but indeed conservatism. "Why change, since, on the whole, things are going well'"
At the turning point of 1935-6 the Qnebec people had a single changereflex which manifested itself bilaterally: on the federal level by the support, in 1935, of Liberal promises against the inability of the Bennett regime to offset the effects of the great depression; and, in 1936, on the provincial level by the rejection of the Liberal regime, which was not so much rotten and corrupt as it was peculiarly superseded by events at a time when new powers were dawning on the horizon. But for the last twenty years, Quebec (not counting the ambiguous provincial election of 1939 because of the "conscription" issue) has voted for the status quo. And it will do so indefinitely, unless a sharp stomach ache forces it to take a corrective remedy.
But Quebec, voting in the last twenty years, in federal and provincial elections, for the status quo is, by the same token, involved in the play of opposition between the provincial governments and the Liberal government of Ottawa (at least up until June 1957) which seems to be one of the major principles of balance in the Canadian federation. s In the province of Quebec the importance of this phenomenon tends to be exaggerated and simplified because of M. Duplessis' personal role.
It is claimed that the provinces are not satisfied with Ottawa, particularly in respect to fiscal agreements. The mistake consists in supposing this pretext to be their driving force. Such a force arises from a twofold fact: (1) to the extent that the Liberal party was nationally strong, the provincial legislatures set up non-Liberal or anti-Liberal governments, with strictly provincial or regional functions; (2) our electoral system, which is as absurd in the provinces as it is in Ottawa, reduced to insignificance itself the oppositions in the legislatures. Let us consider in turn each of these two factors.
British Columbia, Alberta, and Saskatchewan are administered by third parties which preserve a melancholy memory of their past radicalism (this is a little less true with regard to the party of Mr. Douglas). Since the time of Hepburn and Godbout, Ontario and Quebec have been in a full era of conservatism. Nova Scotia, after twenty-three years of a Liberal regime, has just become converted to conservatism, as was its Atlantic sister New Brunswick in 1952. What legislatures still have liberal leanings? Prince Edward Island which is a great rural municipality indulging in the luxury of being a province; Newfoundland whose political umbilical cord has not yet been severed from its Ottawa mother; Manitoba where a regional government contrasts strongly with its dynamic neighbours to right and left. Mathematically these amount to about 1/ 15 of the Canadian population.
Seven provinces out of ten, or 14/ 15 of the Canadian popUlation, split politically when they vote in provincial elections. It is as if the Canadian electorate led a double life. This is probably a healthy situation; at any rate it exists. It provides a strong opposition between the central government and the provinces. But this opposition expresses itself on the level of fiscal agreements! Of course, but "There's more than that, young man." Provincial governments represent local solidarities and interests. This is what they are there for.
No national political programme, precisely because it is national, can suit all regions. Furthermore, it is impossible to set up a political programme which combines at the same time an universal and a pluralist nature. As a result the provincial governments, having continually to make representations at Ottawa for any reason or case whatsoever, are always in a state of virtual or actual tension with the central government; and they make themselves heard all the more easily if they have no party affiliation with the federal Liberals. What caused the continued success of the latter also caused a corresponding weakness in the provincial Liberals. Quebec is a good case in point, even though its Liberal leadership has not taken up till now any practical consequences from the situation.
Let us pass on to the second factor which I set out ahove. There is, at the present time, a pronounced lack of parliamentary opposition in provincial legislatures. The situation is all the more serious in that numbers are smaller. In Ottawa a total Opposition of 60 to 75 members is too weak. Provincial legislatures have only token Oppositions: 4 or 5 members.
At present in Quebec, the Liberals, as a result of the recent by-elections and two withdrawals, have only 17 members to oppose the compact group of M. Duplessis. The case of Ontario is worse: 83 Conservatives against 13 in Opposition. British Columbia: 39 against 12; Newfoundland: 32 against 4. In New Brunswick (37 against 15) and Alberta (37 against 24) the lack of balance is less marked. Nova Scotia alone has a balanced parliament: 23 against 20. This is not a recent fact. Eight years ago the situation was worse. In the ten provincial legislatures there were then only 89 Opposition members (an average of 9 per province) facing 446 supporters of the Governments. That is a ratio of one Opposition to five Government members. 4 From the point of view of the opposition between the central government and the provinces, there ensues this flagrant consequence: that the excess of power (which is the political energy) of most of the provincial governments must find an outlet somewhere else. This is the "foreign policy" of the provinces, and of Canadians, above all and everywhere in Canada, great provincialists. The net result is often inefficiency, stagnation, corruption. And if the provincial prime minister should have an ancien regime temperament, virtual dictatorship follows. Dictators, hav-ing suppressed or rendered fictitious any internal opposition, need an outside scapegoat, which serves to hide the deficiencies and failures of their home politics. Most provincial governments have found one: Ottawa. For the great majority of Canadians that is the only "foreign policy" which they understand.
And so, it is comprehensible that the majority of the provincial prime ministers took active part in the last federal election; yet the master of them all, M. Duplessis, stayed right at home. This proves his superiority! His prestige within his own province remained intact. He merely allowed some of his liegemen to "settle accounts." (During the provincial election of 1956, federal opponents had even entered the struggle against certain Union Nationale candidates.) One can even attribute to M. Duplessis' electoral machine some of the rare gains which the Conservative party made in Quebec in the federal election of June 10, 1957.
II
Having situated in its pan-Canadian setting the interplay of Quebec political parties, we must now restrict our study to their provinciallirnits.
The Union Nationale is a man without a party. This is its strength and its weakness. The provincial Liberals constitute a party without a man. That is their weakness without being their strength.
Among the provincial conservatives an aggregate of interests serves as a substitute for the party. To be accurate, one must make clear that it is not solely a question of flatly material interests; think for example of the number of those who are rallied by M. Duplessis' verbal and ineffectual "autonomisme" which transcends, in their minds, the most blatant defects of the regime.
Among the provincial Liberals, one finds all the elements of a party. There is a faithful rank and file which has theoretically the means of putting the party into power. There are certain traditional values which, even though they may not be lofty and are shackled by the ball and chain of a weighty past, survive in spite of everything, and can give rise freely to a dynamism which has been up till now insufficiently or sadly used. But this party lacks men. (My viewpoint here is far broader than one which wonld merely involve the official leadership or the personality of M. Lapalme, whether or not the latter remains the nominal or effective leader of the party.) Now, there is no substitute for men.
M. Duplessis is the Union Nationale and vice versa. But what is M. Duplessis himself? He is a "boss." And I hasten to add, lest this narrow our conceptions, he is an autocrat, or, if you wish, a "sincere boss." He is not an autocrat-through-efficiency, as Mr. C. D. Howe was; he is a convinced autocrat. He loves, seeks, wants to be what is strong. He is an ancien regime personality, who believes honestly that the established order, because it is established, is good and must last. He has an hierarchical conception of the social order: everything which tends to egalitarian or at least social advancement, makes him feel ill at ease, as if it were something which goes against the natural order of things. His anti-trade-unionism, which causes him to take great risks, does not stem from a faith in capitalism or in the virtues of free enterprise, but indeed from a rejection of the idea that a social group might seek to exert a political influence greater than its economic strength. For him, democracy is a means of selecting a strong political species, rather than a rule of fair play and a measure of protection for the weak. The strong man is the successful man. M. Duplessis' prototype is the great capitalist business man whom he admires, not because of his riches, but because of his power.
He is feared, first of all by his chief lieutenants from whom he does not hide that they are what they are because of him: this creates bonds of fidelity of a special nature. He has been able to render ineffective all opposition, including the Liberal opposition which suffers obviously from an inferiority complex. Since 1948 he has reduced parliamentary procedure to a hollow pretence. There would be ample cause for ten pipe-line debates at each session of the Quebec legislature. The great scandal is not that such types of debate have not taken place, but that an entire pDpulation should not be scandalized by the fact.
M. Duplessis is a cDlourfui personality. He does not play the part of a grand seigneur like his predecessDr, M. Taschereau. He was able, at the outset of his first victories, tD fashion for himself an unaffected language and a personality which not only tolerated but invited a certain affectionate familiarity: "Maurice," people call him. With age he has become sDmewhat pompous. He sermonizes. One could assemble a delectable collection of his Joseph Prud'homme epigrams: "The best land is the human mind"; "The best health-insurance is health." He professes the cult of hard work and sets himself up as an example.
These broad outlines of too brief a sketch paint out that M. Duplessis' bold originality is in keeping with his sustained successes. His supreme skill consists of keeping in tune with the natiDnalistic sentiments of his compatriots while pursuing at the same time an anti-nationalistic policy (cf. his participation with great foreigu capital in the development of GfiRARD BBRGBRON natural resources, the absence of any coherent and progressive policy in matters of education-which is however culturally vital for French Canadians). He knows how to sound skilfully the chord of clericalism and anti-communism; and in this respect, following a technique which has proven effective elsewhere, he does not shrink before the "big lie": Abitibi machine guns, Polish treasures, communist sabotage of the Three Rivers bridge. He realizes the binding power of gold chains and is adroit at using public subsidies. In his initial alliances, he has got the best of all those who were instrumental in his first successes.
The power which he holds is both simple and complex. He is informed about everything; he decides everything; he does not trust his collaborators, even though they may be of cabinet rank. A session of the Quebec legislature takes on easily the appearance of a one-man show. The electoral outcome indicates to what extent such a regime can produce at the opportune moment "L'attraction de la plus grande force." This phenomenon was clearly perceptible during the 1956 elections, to such an extent that the magnitude of the means used in that instance produced a widespread though ephemeral reaction, crystaJlized around the letter of the Abbes Dion and O'Neil, which made headlines in Canadian papeIf and many foreign reviews.
But he is a courageous man, and on occasion stUbborn. He knows ho\\ to retreat and let people forget (there were no press conferences fOl several weeks after the Dion-O'Neil affair), but he never gives in. I believe his politics to be fundamentally and generally bad for the peopi< of Quebec; but I have no reason to doubt his good faith. With all hi: faults, he em bodies, to the point of being a prototype, the defects of , purely formal and demagOgic democracy, but also the state of politica immaturity of too great a part of the Quebec population, of which it ha: been said that it had nothing but feelings. One can subscribe only in par to the following lines of J. B. McGeachy:
He represents, as probably no other politician has ever done since the day of the late Henri Bourassa, the determination of the French-Canadians t. remain themselves and to preserve, in the heart of North America, thei special and distinctive culture, their faith and language, their reverence fo the family as the proper source of instruction and compassion, their Galli high spirits and gaiety. their belief that the material rewards of this mundan life are as nothing compared with spiritual grace, their attachment to all cestral acres and houses.
Mr. Duplessis represents all this but he does so, let it be noted, less mil tantly tban he did in the late 1930s when this correspondent met bim as comparatively young politician flushed with success, rambunctious in h:
social bebavior, self-confident to tbe point of arrogance.'
I have preferred to point out some aspects of M. Duplessis rather than attempt to analyse the electoral and administrative machine he has created. We can see quite easily the results of its operation though its mechanism may be hidden. It is undoubtedly the wealthiest and most thorough that Canada has ever known.' In more than one respect the "bossism" of M. Duplessis offers remarkable analogies with other experiments in America : mythical anti-communism and militant anti-tradeunionism, subsidized public works (hospitals, bridges, and schools) all inaugurated with great public fanfare--as under Hague in New Jersey; apparent democratic forms and great declarations of civic faith, control over provincial employees and the police, almost complete destruction of parliamentary liberties--as under Long in Louisiana; various restrictions placed upon election proceedings--as under Pendergast in Kansas City; handling of patronage with sufficient subtlety so as to reduce or hide incidents likely to make the "'gime unpopular-as under Mnrphy and Flynn at Tammany Hall, Byrd in Virginia, or Dewey in the state of New York. It is astonishing that the majorities of the Union Nationale are not larger and that its political hold is not stronger. There is no doubt, in this respect, a factor to be taken into account: space. Relatively small though it be, the population of Quebec is spread over a territory much vaster than a great municipality or an American state. There is also the integration into a federative constitutional system which prevents this autocracy from becoming something more than a virtual dictatorship restricted to certain levels of public life. The Union N ationale, as I have stated above, is a man without a party. This seems to imply that when M. Duplessis disappears there will no longer be a Union Nationale. This is a mistaken idea: the non-dynastic transmission of power in such a system does not take place smoothly; but nothing prevents us from thinking that a new Duplessis, with a possibly less openly autocratic temperament, will rise, and inherit followers who believe confusedly but practically in political autocracy and in social "statism" as values desirable in themselves.
Those who think that the fate of provincial Conservatives is linked with the state of health or the political longevity of M. Duplessis confuse two things: the precariousness of too strong a personal power and the broad ideological and social conditions which are not only the basis of the success of this personal power, but also the justification of its very abuses. In other words, "duplessisme," whatever superficially altered form it may assume, will survive its original, because it expresses remarkably well an essential social tendency of our Quebec milieu: a tendency towards a static autocracy, combining vague theocratic and nationalistic elements, in which the exploitation of the myths-in their Quebec versions-of autonomism and anti-communism is politically profitable.
The Liberals, in this respect, are in a position of obvious inferiority: they are not, or do not appear, sufficiently different from "duplessistes" who have, furthermore, brought to an exemplary degree of efficiency, in another context, the "gouinism" or "taschereauism" of the past. Those who are more than forty will at least remember the latter. To counter the inevitable statism, inherent in "duplessisme," the Liberals are not committing themselves with sufficient firmness to the cause of social and political reform, which is no less essential and quantitatively important.
An elementary law of political success is simplification: one must be white or black, for or against, for the ayes or for the no's, beloved or hated. Since 1948 the provincial Liberals have appeared in a rather greyish light where the for and the aye are confused with the against and the no, and this situation wins them merely feelings of vague sympathy involving neither very firm decisions nor irrevocable support. Before they can effectively exploit their proper sphere of activity the Liberals must first take stock of their ideology themselves and then show clearly where they stand.
Rarely has a political party been so substantially strong and yet given such an impression of weakness. Its primary source of strength is to be itself and to be able, from the outset, without the need for organization or propaganda, to count on about 700,000 voters, that is, approximately 40 per cent of the active electorate. Our parliamentary system of elections, our political customs, and the coincidence of relative prosperity, are combined in such a way as to imprison us in the straight jacket of a two-party system. In the far-foreseeable future, two parties only are biologically possible: beyond them everything is but melancholy romanticism, which beckons those dedicated to frustration. Not only is this party predominant in the Opposition; it is the whole Opposition. Yet the Opposition such as it is, is not made up of 20 members against 73, but of 47 per cent in Opposition against 52 per cent: that is the measure of its true stature.
This numerical strength, which, more than its own merits, ensures the party a monopoly in the OppOSition, is rather passive, formless, capricious; wituess the 2 per cent of "Liberals" who voted for Duplessis in June 1957. But such a massive electorate, entirely devoted, is a power that must be taken into account in all Liberal plans for the future. If we recall the 40 per cent of Liberal votes in the defeat of 1944, the 36.5 per cent in the collapse of 1948, if we do not forget the upward swing of 1952 with 46 per cent (even though the last election has shown a downward trend of about 1.5 per cent) we will understand why I have estimated at 40 per cent the present vote that the Liberals can count on. There is nothing catastrophic in this temporary stagnation-any living organism runs the risk of going through such phases. What is dangerous, even fatal, is the risk of chronic stagnation, whether it is accepted or not.
One can blame the spell of "duplessisme," which has always made capital out of the ambient political amorality which permeates our "Catholic province." But if the Liberals have stagnated for a few elections, it is because their traditional electoral methods have reached a saturation point. Stunned since the blow of June 20, 1956, nothing shows, from the outside, whether they are in the process of recuperating. Like a punch-drunk boxer, they seem unable to co-ordinate their efforts. They are more aware of the obstacle which confronts them than of their power to overcome it. And above all, they do not yet seem convinced that one does not fight "duplessisme" with the same weapons which give it, at the outset, an advantage of five to one.
The opportunity is given the Liberal party to settle two of its important problems: (I) the equivocal tutelage of the federal Liberals; (2) its great poverty. If all political differences are somehow resolved in compromise it does not follow that the compromise must always be settled in an equivocal atmosphere. When M. Lapalme strongly takes sides on the question of natural resources what confidence can he enlist when the opposite camp replies that Messrs St. Laurent and Howe believe that M. Duplessis has struck a good bargain? When M. Lapalme proclaims his future freedom of action in matters of fiscal problems, he hears Messrs Lapointe, Lesage and Pinard say, "We are on your side, M. Lapalme!" At the same time when M. Lapalme is concentrating his efforts on the level of local organization, he does not even know how many organizations of federal members are going to compromise with the "duplessistes" against his own candidates. How can one act freely under the threat of such fratricidal dagger thrusts?
The dilemma will be solved when the provincial Liberals clearly free themselves from the tutelage, harmful and opposed to their aims, of their Ottawa brethren. One day the provincial conservative party, which amounted to nothing, became something, by concentrating its activities on the provincial level (I overlook all the hypocritical imposture of this demagogic provincialism, turning in a vicious circle); why should the Quebec Liberal party, wWch has an identity of its own, not become a party fulfiIling an open and operative "provincial function?" It need only have the courage to seek rebirth by the integration of those vivifying elements wWch are available but which it lacks; they await only a sign of friendsWp and the assurance of unreserved hospitality.
Secondly, and even more important: the provincial Liberal party is poor, in the face of the rich Duplessis organization and is content to derive a title to glory from its poverty. This is a healthy state of affairs, of course, but it might be politically exploited. The party also bears a heavy burden in its dependency on 5 or 10 big subscribers to its treasury. Because of them, it is still in a rut. To democratize a party it is not enough to superimpose upon it a federative structure, to invent a pyra· midal organization reaching to the very centre of the parish or the ward, to institute a system of dues from militant party·members. All tWs can even invite suspicion, if one does not feel the life·blood pulsating within. A straightforward game must be played.
The existence of the Federation Liberale Provinciale has been up until now but a high.sounding promise and not a mechanism of political efficiency, or a training ground for the democratization of the ranks, which are given so much importance. The Federation must be the whole party, its organization, its admittistration, its framework, if it is not to be a burden to the party.
Under present conditions a radical step shonld be taken: either destroy or build up the Federation in order that it may be neither a false repre· sensation nor an itnpeditnent to action. Therein lies the hope of the party's self.financing, which would allow a sufficient freedom of action with respect to federal aid and important subscribers to its coffers. Can the federated subscribers supply the party treasury with sufficient funds? At the present titne it is estimated that the Federation has 35,000 members paying dues of two dollars. There is no exaggeration in thinking that the least aggressive campaign would triple its numbers in twelve months: 100,000 members giving an average of ten dollars (a mittimum of $2 and a maxitnum of $100) would produce 1 million dollars, or 4 millions in 4 years! Out of 700,000 Liberal voters is it far·fetched to anticipate that at least 100,000 would contribute?
Going still more deeply into the question, one can see that the problem is not a simple one. The Liberal party needs young social and intellectual teams to carry on its work of self-democratization. Now these remain . on the fringe not only of the Liberal party but of politics. And the greatest admission of weakness on the part of the Liberals is not that they have been constantly bested by the shrewdest politician in our history, but that they have allowed organizations of young intellectuals to be formed on the fringes of their party without giving them a forum and the political weapons to carry out a successful battle. It is a vicious circle. What is involved is not only the shortcomings of a party, but also the cultural phenomenon of the devaluation of politics in French Canada. At the end of the war a new generation of Quebec young people became aware of the very rapid transformation of their society by industrialization and urbanization. They became active in social and trade-union movements, journalism, and university teaching. The federal administration, diplomacy, the C.B.C., the National Film Board, the legal profession, offered in greater numbers than ever before outlets which were less subject to the various risks of political life, and this at the height of the Duplessis era. The result is undeniable: young people, of whom a certain number, in days gone by, would have chosen a political career, found themselves engaged in professions in which they were led to act according to a social or cultural order of priority. Politics offered no incentive. The problems of the Liberals are basically those of an absentee political generation.
In the last year or two we have witnessed a still-diffident return to politics. People show a tendency, in various sectors, to group themselves for a still indeterminate political action, but aiming at a democratization of public life in Quebec. That is the goal of certain movements such as the Rassemblement and the Ligues de Moralite. Trade-unions are once again becoming more aggressive in their political action as a result of recent labour conflicts in the province of Quebec. But this question would require a separate paper to discuss it. As for the Liberals themselves, the game is not lost. One of the bitterest critics of the "old guard" characteristics still shown by the Liberals at large, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, could not refrain from stating, And yet I cannot help admiring the tenacity of the small group of men who set out to infuse some democratic blood into the veins of a party which has never been anything morc than a syndicate of private interests. . . . But inasmuch as they have accepted the Liberal challenge it is only right that they should now play the game to the end. And one must recognize that, in this death struggle, they have not lost the first innings. The Liberal machine, I mean the coterie of finance and reaction, has not succeeded in destroying the Federation. 7 Another independent observer, Lorenzo Pare, wrote at the same time: The Liberals of Quebec do not need to hide behind a mask. They can convert their present setbacks into factors of strength.
For example. the Liberal ranks suffer from the defection of certain professional classes, from which our career politicians have always been recruited. So much the better, if they prefer the fruits of power to the duties of political action: the field of parliamentary representation and the meaning of our democracy will be thereby expanded.
So much the better if the young and the intellectuals are showing signs of impatience: their presence and their influence will be welcomed all the more in the bosom of the different parties. On the other hand the intellectuals and young people must realize that they are dedicating themselves to powerlessness-by dissociating themselves from the mass of the citizenry-if they refuse to unite with the traditional parties and give life to these common denominators of the whole nation. 8 
IV
The collapse of the Bloc Populaire Canadien has confirmed the failure not only of a nationalist party but of a third party in the province of Quebec. The tradition of these ephemeral parties, born of circumstances and disappearing with them, is a long one. In 1872 a national movement was brought into existence by the Indian affairs in the West and the controversy over the schools of New Brunswick; in 1885, Honore Mercier received almost complete support for his national movement set up to protest the execution of Riel; the nationalist movement of 1911 was a reaction of young Liberals, led by Henri Bourassa, against the supposedly imperialistic politics of Laurier; in 1935, a similar reaction of the young Liberals manifested itself, with the creation of the Action Liberale Nationale, against the provincial leadership of Taschereau. In 1877 and 1911 these movements exerted their influence chiefly on the federal level, but the movements led by Honore Mercier and his grandson, Paul Gouin, were provincial ones.
These political movements have features in common: they were born as the result of a split on a question of principle, and the dissident elements in the major party-Conservative until 1900-temporarily allied themselves with the other party which contributed both personnel and finance. It was the better organized and wealthier party which absorbed the other, once the temporary battle was over. It is thus that the puny conservative party of M. Duplessis became the powerful Union Nationale, as a result of its alliance with the young and dynamic Action Liberale N ationale. The genius of M. Duplessis has succeeded in maintaining this double imposture of a regime born of nationalism and social reform which is, at the same time, undoubtedly the most anti-nationalistic and most reactionary in the Western world.
The originality of the Bloc Populaire Canadien springs from the fact that it was born not as a result of the dissidence of a wing breaking away from the traditional party, but thanks to a group of men who, for the most part, were not practising politicians. But, like the other movements, it was created under the pressure of circumstances (plebiscite and threat of conscription) which it did not long survive. Furthermore, it wanted to preserve its identity in the face of the two traditional parties. As for the ideology which inspired it, one could find in it quite incoherent, not to say contradictory, elements. But it is only right to stress that the Bloc Populaire, just like the Action Liberale Nationale, was essentially a reform movement, centred on the awareness of national problems. Both of these parties hoped that their early nationalism would be changed into a programme of social reform, which was incidentally tinged with a certain radicalism.· Since the collapse of the Bloc Populaire Canadien, Quebec has been a barren land for third parties. The C.C.F., whose Quebec branch has recently been called, in European style, Parti Social Democrate, has never been able to gain a serious foothold in Quebec. Thanks to a proliferation of candidates, it was able to get one member elected in Abitibi county a few years ago. It does not usually present candidates outside the metropolitan area of Montreal and a few other urban counties. In 1952, it received 1 per cent of the popular vote but in 1956 the vote dropped to 0.5 per cent. This party would seem to be the preferred party of the younger generation, of social and trade-union groups, of social-nationalists. But as it is destined to impotence on the Quebec scene (because of its foreign and socialistic origins), it enlists more passive sympathy than active support. At this juncture, we reach an apparent paradox: the survivors of the Action Liberale Nationale and the Bloc Populaire teams themselves admit that nationalism could not be the keystone of a third group, but it is precisely the inability of the Parti Social Democrate to don a provincial gnise which makes it unacceptable in Quebec. Which brings us back to the option offered by the Liberals.'· Here once more we find the fundamental problems mentioned above. This party has always maintained a radical wing and a tradition of free discussion. This suffices to give the party a certain viability, but does not however endow it with the power to attract the young ,!lite which it still lacks.
A part of this young tilite is at present united to the recent movement of the Rassemblement, which defines itseif as a movement for education and democratic action. The confused circumstances which have surrounded the birth and the short history of this group do not allow us to say in which direction it will evolve, nor even if it will continue to live. Its originality consists in an effort to enter independently into provincial politics. But in this connection there are smaller groups which are exceptions: the members of the Parti Social Democrate have already made their choice and have been welcomed. Their interest in the Rassemblement stems from the desire to have more elbow-room: they seek natural allies. They also conceal poorly the fear of being one day swallowed up. Certain people who have never been active in the Liberal ranks, believe that only a difficult though not impossible revival in the Liberal party can bring about any lasting change whatsoever. Finally, others are vaguely awaiting something yet undefined to take place, possibly within the Rassemblement itself. By these last two categories, it is thought that the P.S.D. is still-born, and to them this means wider opportunity.
The typical "rassemble" is a man in his thirties who went through the depressiou as a child and the war as an adolescent. As soon as he reached mature age, about ten years ago, he became engaged in social action, usually trade-unionism, as a result of which he has developed a keen social consciousness which has rebelled more than once against the unbelievable political mediocrity of the milieu. "Duplessisme" sickens him and the Liberals, who have disappointed him, do not appeal to him in the least. He would not be French Canadian if he had not inherited a deep scorn for petty politics (polilicaillerie) which generations' have handed down to him. Today he is awakening politically: in the post-war years, he gave importance first and foremost to social progress, adapting his own conduct to it; but in the heat of battle he became progressively aware that any social problem is posed initially and is finally resolved in politics. But how is he to act politically? Two important groups exist and are possible and he rejects them almost without distinguishing between them. Others have a marginal or symbolic existence, such as the Parti Social Democrate. Politically, he is a worried, bitter, aimless man. The social force which he represents has no political expression. It operates in a vacuum.
If asked in what direction the Rassemblement will evolve, the answer would have to take into account the immediate political choice which will be made by the younger generation, which feels the need to join once again a political party. It seems to this author that the democrat-ization of the Liberal party is a less difficult task than the creation of a third power, whether or not the Parti Social Democrate or the Rassemblement be its nucleus."
The evolution of "duplessisme" itself also entails an unknown factor. M. Duplessis' anti-labour politics prompted a new reaction from union leaders during the 1957 strikes. At the time of the Murdochville strike, M. Gerard Pinard, president of the C.T.C.C. ee.c.c.L.), stated during a public meeting:
After all that has taken place in our province, it is not surprising if the workers are now thinking of a political move to have their rights respected. And we shall use every means available to us, to bring about a victory for the workers.
In a democracy, the three powers: executive, legislative, and judiciary, are entrusted to different hands, but here in Quebec one man holds these powers, M. Duplessis, who makes laws and then decides whether they are to apply in such-aDd-such a case. This form of government is much more dangerous than a dictatorship because its leader would have us believe that it is a democracy whereas it is a true dictatorship. It has been said that people have the government they deserve. We have a rotten government and I believe it is time to undertake a justified and conclusive battle.
The battle we are waging will be won in the streets and this day I ask all our intellectuals and our clergy to take the necessary steps to participate in this struggle and go down into the streets with us, in order that justice and the freedom of the workers be respected. 12 Mr. Roger Provost, president of the Quebec Federation of Workers, which for a long time gave the impression of being on the best of terms with M. Duplessis, despite his anti-labour policies, stated at the same time:
We must recapture once again the driving spirit of the pioneers and this time, since the enemy of the working class hides behind political parties which it fattens all the better to overwhelm us, we shall have to supplant the political party.
Workers, what is the use of our victories, our struggles in the picket lines, as long as we elect governments controlled by bosses who, with a stroke of the pen, or by an administrative decree, can wipe out in one sweep all our past gains.
There is only one place where we shall win the right of association in this province and that is in the parliament of Quebec. 18 These are new voices since the famous Asbestos strike of 1949. But three years later the Union Nationale once again elected 70 members in a house of 93 seats ....
